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Abstract
Privacy preserving machine learning is an active area of research usually relying on
techniques such as homomorphic encryption or secure multiparty computation. Recent
novel encryption techniques for performing machine learning using deep neural nets on
images have recently been proposed by Tanaka [10] and Sirichotedumrong, Kinoshita,
and Kiya [8]. We present new chosen-plaintext and ciphertext-only attacks against both
of these proposed image encryption schemes and demonstrate the attacks’ effectiveness
on several examples.1
Keywords: image encryption, privacy preserving, machine learning, deep learning,
deep neural network, cryptanalysis
1 Introduction
Secure computation is a major theme in modern cryptography with many different ap-
proaches to the general problem of how to encrypt data securely while still being able to
use it for some form of computation. Methods for secure computation include homomorphic
encryption, multi-party computation, zero-knowledge proofs, functional encryption, and
program obfuscation [7]. A particularly interesting application area is to enable machine
learning to be done on data while it is secured by encryption. Some work in this direction
of implementing machine learning and deep neural nets using homomorphic encryption has
been done as in [1, 2, 3, 5].
Other novel techniques for performing machine learning using deep neural nets (DNNs)
on images have recently been proposed; namely, the Tanaka scheme in [10] and the Siri-
chotedumrong, Kinoshita, and Kiya (SKK) scheme in [8]. The Tanaka scheme relies on
performing deterministic encryption with the same key for all the images used for training
and querying the DNN. The SKK scheme supports using different encryption keys for dif-
ferent images, and the encryption scheme preserves local properties of the images so that
the machine learning can still be carried out.
We are able to break the Tanaka scheme using a chosen-plaintext attack. This is not that
surprising, since it is a result in theoretical cryptography that a deterministic encryption
scheme can never satisfy the property of being CPA secure [4]. Tanaka himself admits in
[6] that “scrambled images are not exactly encrypted although the perceptual information
can be hidden” and “effective algorithms for reconstructing original images from block-wise
scrambled images are still available, to the best of our knowledge.” So it is acknowledged
1https://github.com/ahchang98/image-encryption-scheme-attacks
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that such attacks could happen, but we are not aware of other papers that have clearly
demonstrated any attacks.
We are also able break the variant of the SKK scheme that uses the same encryption
key for each image using a chosen-plaintext attack. For the variant of the SKK scheme that
uses a different encryption key for each image, a chosen-plaintext attack is unlikely, but we
are instead able to develop ciphertext-only attacks that recover much of the original image.
These attacks work by exploiting the fact that, in this scheme, much of the encryption is
done with respect to each pixel without their movement. It is then easy to unscramble the
color components at each pixel such that the gradient magnitude at each pixel is minimized
to a certain extent. Indeed, in realistic input images it is commonly the case that, as we
observe, the gradient magnitude at each pixel is close to minimal, due to the gradually
changing color component values. The SKK encryption scheme is also used in the related
paper [9] and our attacks apply there as well.
2 Proposed Image Encryption Schemes
We will represent an image I in this paper as a matrix of size U × V , where each element
of the matrix is a pixel p = (u, v). Each pixel has three color channels red, green, and blue,
labeled pR, pG, and pB , respectively, each of which is stored as an L-bit integer (i.e. as a
value in [0, 2L − 1]). For example, for an 8-bit image L = 8.
We describe to the best of our knowledge below the two proposed image encryption
schemes that we attack later.
2.1 Tanaka Scheme
We present a version of the Tanaka scheme that we believe is equivalent to the one presented
in the original paper [10].
Suppose an L-bit full color image I and secret encryption key K are given as input; the
Tanaka scheme proceeds as follows:
1. I is divided into blocks of predetermined size M ×M (M = 4 in the experiments
presented in [10].) Consider such a block P .
2. With respect to the secret encryption key K, the color components within P are
shuffled. More precisely, the procedure is this: choose p and p′ as pixels in P , and
choose C and C ′ in {R,G,B}. Then swap pC and p′C′ ; repeat this procedure as
desired. The manner in which the pixels are shuffled is the same for all blocks P .
3. Optionally, with respect to the secret encryption key K, the values of pseudorandomly
selected color components within P are reversed (e.g. a color component pB of a pixel
p ∈ P originally with value 57 gets 255− 57 = 198, where 255 = 111111112 is the max
value for 8-bit images). The manner in which the values of the pixels are reversed is
the same for all blocks P .
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Figure 1: An 8-bit input image (original size 32× 32) and an encryption using the Tanaka
scheme with block size M = 4 and optional reversing.
(We remark that, although the original paper states “each block is split to the upper 4-bit
and the lower 4-bit images”, the authors of this paper did not find any useful interpretation
of this step when comparing with the code provided in [10].)
We believe that Tanaka trained the networks used for validation accuracy testing using
sets of pictures encrypted with the same key. Indeed, even if Tanaka trained using sets of
pictures encrypted with different keys, [8] experimentally shows that image classification
accuracy when testing DNN models trained using these images is very low compared to
DNN models trained using sets of pictures encrypted using other schemes. So the Tanaka
scheme using different encryption keys is potentially undesirable for the wanted applications
in machine learning and deep neural networks.
2.2 Sirichotedumrong, Kinoshita, and Kiya (SKK) Scheme
We present a version of the SKK scheme that we believe is equivalent to the one presented
in the original paper [8].
Suppose an L-bit full color image I and secret encryption key K are given as input; the
SKK scheme proceeds as follows:
1. I is divided into individual pixels. Consider such a pixel p.
2. The Negative-Positive Transformation: With respect to the secret encryption key K,
a pseudorandom bit xR ∈ {0, 1} dependent on the key is generated and the pixel value
pR is modified using
pR =
{
pR (xR = 0)
pR ⊕ (2L − 1) (xR = 1)
(where XOR with 2L − 1 = 111 . . . 1112 is to flip the bits of the value pR). The same
is done for pG and pB : that is, pseudorandom bits xG, xB ∈ {0, 1} are generated from
the key, not necessarily equal to xR, and the pixel values of pG and pB are modified
in the same way. The values of xR, xG, and xB are not necessarily the same for all
pixels p.
3. Optionally, with respect to the secret encryption key K, a pseudorandom integer
xS ∈ [0, 5] is generated and the values of pR, pG, and pB are shuffled, where each of
the six possible integers corresponds to a unique possible permutation. The value of
xS is not necessarily the same for all pixels p.
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Figure 2: An 8-bit input image (original size 96× 96) and an encryption using the Sirichot-
edumrong, Kinoshita, and Kiya scheme with optional shuffling.
The experiments in [8] cite results both using the same encryption key and different
encryption keys to encrypt many images.
3 Attacks
We present below our attacks on the two proposed image encryption schemes described
above.
3.1 Attacking the Tanaka Scheme
For the Tanaka scheme we present a full chosen-plaintext attack: that is, we are certainly
able to recover the original image with all its colors and features. We have no full nor partial
ciphertext-only attack against the Tanaka scheme at this time.
Being able to query the encryption scheme up to O(M2) times with chosen plaintexts to
obtain the corresponding ciphertexts, we wish to fully decrypt a given ciphertext Enc(I) of
the original 8-bit image I. To do this, recall that the manner in which the pixels are shuffled
and in which the values of the pixels are reversed is the same for all blocks. Recall also
that this scheme uses the same encryption key for each input image, such that the block
operations are the same across different ciphertexts. These are essential to the attack: the
idea is to create and encrypt helper images Hj of size M ×M such that we are able to tell
exactly what shuffling and reversing has been done, and decrypt the Enc(Hj) at the same
time as the blocks of Enc(I) to obtain the original image.
We choose to create M ×M = M2 helper images for simplicity, although this number
can be reduced by a constant as shown later. To create the helper images Hj of size M ×M
with j ∈ [1,M2], fix a pixel pj unique to Hj (such that each pixel location in a block of size
M ×M corresponds to a unique Hj). We choose four distinct integers a, b, c, z ∈ [0, 2L − 1]
such that a, b, c, and z are distinct from (2L − 1) − a, (2L − 1) − b, (2L − 1) − c, and
(2L − 1)− z. Then we set for pj in Hj the color components pjR = a, pjG = b, and pjB = c;
we set for all other pixels q in Hj the color components qR = qG = qB = z. Uniqueness of
the values ensures that we can sort the color components into their original locations, and
the distinction between a, b, c, and z against (2L − 1) − a, (2L − 1) − b, (2L − 1) − c, and
(2L − 1)− z ensures that we are able to tell when a value has been reversed.
After querying the encryption scheme with the helper image Hj to obtain its ciphertext
Enc(Hj), we partially decrypt Enc(Hj) to recover the pixel p
j by undoing the shuffling and
reversing. More precisely, to first undo the reversing we check for each pixel p the value of
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pC with C ∈ {R,G,B} to see if it is equal to (2L − 1) − a, (2L − 1) − b, or (2L − 1) − c,
and if it is, subtract it from 2L− 1 to obtain the original value. Then to undo the shuffling,
we sort the color components of pj into their original locations. We do this process for all
Hj to recover the complete mapping between the color components in a block and the color
components in its encryption. We decrypt Enc(I) to recover I, as desired, by doing the
same operations as above on each pixel pP in each block P in Enc(I) corresponding to pixel
p in Enc(Hj).
Algorithm 1: Tanaka Chosen-Plaintext Attack Helper Image.
Input: Block dimension M ; number of bits L; j ∈ [1,M2].
Output: Helper image Hj of size M ×M .
1 Instantiate empty image Hj of size M ×M ;
2 Fix pj = (u, v) ∈ Hj such that pj 6= p` ∀ ` ∈ [1,M2] \ {j};
3 Choose distinct integers a, b, c, z ∈ [0, 2L − 1] such that a, b, c, d
are distinct from (2L − 1)− a, (2L − 1)− b, (2L − 1)− c, (2L − 1)− z;
4 pjR ← a;
5 pjG ← b;
6 pjB ← c;
7 foreach q = (u, v) ∈ Hj do
8 if q 6= pj then
9 qR ← z;
10 qG ← z;
11 qB ← z;
12 return Hj ;
Algorithm 2: Tanaka Chosen-Plaintext Attack.
Input: Encrypted input image Enc(I) of size U × V ; number of bits L; encrypted
helper images Enc(Hj)’s of size M ×M , chosen integers a, b, c.
Modifies: Enc(I), Enc(Hj)’s to decrypt them.
1 for j ← 1 to M2 do
2 foreach p = (u, v) ∈ Enc(H) do
3 foreach C ∈ {R,G,B} do
4 if pC = (2
L − 1)− a ∨ pC = (2L − 1)− b ∨ pC = (2L − 1)− c then
5 pC ← (2L − 1)− pC ;
6 foreach P ∈ Enc(I) do // For each MxM block P in Enc(I)
7 pPC ← (2L − 1)− pPC ; // Change the corresponding pixel
8 for j ← 1 to M2 do
9 p← pj = (u, v) ∈ Enc(Hj);
10 Sort color components within Enc(Hj) such that pR = a, pG = b, pB = c;
11 foreach P ∈ Enc(I) do
12 Modify pPR, p
P
G, p
P
B in the same way as above;
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Figure 3: An 8-bit image encrypted with the Tanaka scheme and its decryption using the
attack above.
We described the attack above using 1-pixel subvidisions of the M × M blocks, but
we wish to consider larger subdivisions to reduce the number of helper images. Observe
that the number of distinct integers in [0, 2L − 1] that we can choose to assign to the color
components is 2L/2 = 2L−1, because these integers must be distinct from their reverses
as well. There are 3N color components in a subdivision with N pixels, so we must have
3N ≤ 2L−1. This implies N ≤ 2L−1/3, so one can reduce the number of helper images by
a factor of up to 2L−1/3 through undoing the shuffling and reversing of up to this many
number of pixels in a block at once.
3.2 Attacking the SKK Scheme
For the SKK scheme we present separate attacks for the variants of the scheme using the
same encryption key for all images verses different encryption keys for every image.
3.2.1 Chosen-Plaintext Attack for Same Key Variant
For the scheme using the same encryption key for each image, we present a full chosen-
plaintext attack. One may also use the partial ciphertext-only attacks presented below
when discussing different encryption keys.
Being able to query the encryption scheme once with a chosen plaintext to obtain the
corresponding ciphertexts, we wish to fully decrypt a given ciphertext Enc(I) of the original
8-bit image I. Similar to the attack against the Tanaka scheme, the idea is to create and
encrypt a helper image H, this time of the same size as I, such that we are able to tell exactly
what negative-positive transforming and shuffling has been done, and decrypt Enc(H) at
the same time as Enc(I) to obtain the original image.
To create the helper image H of the same size as I, we choose three distinct integers
a, b, c ∈ [0, 2L − 1] such that a, b, and c are distinct from a ⊕ (2L − 1), b ⊕ (2L − 1), and
c⊕ (2L − 1). Then we set for each pixel p in H the color components pR = a, pG = b, and
pB = c. Uniqueness of the values ensures that we can sort the color components into their
original locations, and the distinction between a, b, and c against a⊕ (2L− 1), b⊕ (2L− 1),
and c ⊕ (2L − 1) ensures that we are able to tell when a value has been negative-positive
transformed.
After querying the encryption scheme with the helper image H to obtain its ciphertext
Enc(H), we decrypt Enc(H) to recover H by undoing the negative-positive transforming and
shuffling. More precisely, to first undo the negative-positive transforming we check for each
pixel p the value of pC with C ∈ {R,G,B} to see if it is equal to a⊕ (2L − 1), b⊕ (2L − 1),
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or c⊕ (2L − 1), and if it is, XOR it with 2L − 1 to obtain the original value. Then to undo
the shuffling, we sort the color components into their original locations. We decrypt Enc(I)
to recover I, as desired, by doing the same operations as above on each pixel pI in Enc(I)
corresponding to pixel p in Enc(H).
Algorithm 3: SKK Chosen-Plaintext Attack Helper Image.
Input: Input image dimensions U × V ; number of bits L.
Output: Helper image H of size U × V .
1 Instantiate empty image H of size U × V ;
2 Choose distinct integers a, b, c ∈ [0, 2L − 1] such that a, b, c
are distinct from a⊕ (2L − 1), b⊕ (2L − 1), c⊕ (2L − 1);
3 foreach p = (u, v) ∈ H do
4 pR ← a;
5 pG ← b;
6 pB ← c;
7 return H;
Algorithm 4: SKK Chosen-Plaintext Attack.
Input: Encrypted input image Enc(I) of size U × V ; number of bits L; encrypted
helper image Enc(H) of size U × V , chosen integers a, b, c.
Modifies: Enc(I), Enc(H) to decrypt them.
1 foreach p = (u, v) ∈ Enc(H) do
2 foreach C ∈ {R,G,B} do
3 if pC = a⊕ (2L − 1) ∨ pC = b⊕ (2L − 1) ∨ pC = c⊕ (2L − 1) then
4 pC ← pC ⊕ (2L − 1);
5 pIC ← pIC ⊕ (2L − 1);
6 Sort color components within pixel p in Enc(H)
such that pR = a, pG = b, pB = c;
7 Modify pIR, p
I
G, p
I
B in the same way as above;
Figure 4: An 8-bit image encrypted with the SKK scheme and its decryption using the
attack above.
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3.2.2 Ciphertext Only Attacks for Different Keys Variant
For the scheme using different encryption keys for each image, we present two partial
ciphertext-only attacks: that is, we are able to recover enough features of the original image
to presumably be able to distinguish between two possible plaintexts the correct preimage
of the ciphertext more often than at random.
Basic Ciphertext-Only Attack. With access to ciphertexts only, we wish to partially
decrypt a given ciphertext Enc(I) of the original L-bit image I. To do this, we observe that
the perception of edges in images is not determined so much by the specific color or ordered
RGB coordinate triple of a pixel but by properties such as the combined magnitude of the
color components of a pixel. Indeed, experimentation with permuting the color components
of each pixel in some image reveals that the resulting image looks like a grayscale version
of the original image; in particular, the objects are still identifiable.
Figure 5: An 8-bit image and the same image with its color components shuffled in each
pixel. Note how the objects are still identifiable.
We also note that the gradient vector and gradient magnitude at each pixel are commonly
used in computational edge detection, so properties such as the difference in magnitude of a
color component value of a pixel with respect to the color component values of surrounding
pixels also seem to be important. We observe that, for reasonably realistic images, areas
between edges share similar or very gradually changing color component values. This implies
that the gradient magnitude at each pixel is close to minimal.
We suspect the observations above are the reasons why the following partial attack works.
First, we choose either 0 or 1 to be the leading bit of each color component. Then for each
color component of each pixel in Enc(I), if its leading bit is not that number, we XOR the
value with 2L − 1 so that the leading bit is that number.
Algorithm 5: SKK Basic Ciphertext-Only Attack.
Input: Encrypted input image Enc(I) of size U × V ; number of bits L; leading bit
b ∈ {0, 1}.
Modifies: Enc(I) to partially decrypt it.
1 foreach p = (u, v) ∈ Enc(I) do
2 foreach C ∈ {R,G,B} do
3 if bpC/2L−1c 6= b then
4 pC ← pC ⊕ (2L − 1);
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Figure 6: An 8-bit image encrypted with the Sirichotedumrong, Kinoshita, and Kiya scheme,
a possible decryption using the basic attack above, and a grayscale version of the decryption
(this is sometimes clearer).
Figure 7: Another 8-bit image encrypted with the Sirichotedumrong, Kinoshita, and Kiya
scheme, a possible decryption using the basic attack above, and a grayscale version of the
decryption.
Recall that the two main operations on the pixels in this encryption scheme are the
negative-positive transformation and shuffle. Note that the shuffle operation does not change
the combined magnitude of the color components of a pixel, so we essentially ignore this
step. Then we concern ourselves with the negative-positive transformation; but it is likely
in a reasonably realistic image that a color component value of a pixel has the same leading
bit as those of surrounding pixels. So we change all color components of every pixel to
have the same leading bit, and this likely restores the difference in magnitude of a color
component value of a pixel with respect to the color component values of surrounding
pixels and preserves areas between edges sharing similar or very gradually changing color
component values. Hence, we get back an image with somewhat recognizable objects.
(It is easy to think of images that, when encrypted using the SKK scheme, this attack
would fail against. Indeed, a pure black and white picture would be “decrypted” as all-black
or all-white by this algorithm. But such a picture would be non-realistic for the purposes
of this attack.)
More Advanced Ciphertext-Only Attack. With access to ciphertexts only, we
wish to partially decrypt a given ciphertext Enc(I) of the original L-bit image I. Let p be
a pixel that we are trying to determine the original RGB coordinate triple of, and let q be
a different nearby pixel for comparison. Then based off the discussion at the start of the
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basic attack above, one may conclude that minimizing the quantity∑
C∈{R,G,B}
|qC − pC | (3.1)
would be an effective way to recover the original image I, since this minimizes change in
color component values. Indeed, this is the idea behind the more advanced attack: for
each pixel, we try every possible shuffle permutation and negative-positive transformation
selection on its encrypted color component values and pick the combination that minimizes
the quantity above.
More precisely, let p in Enc(I) be a pixel that has not been decrypted yet, and let q in
Enc(I) be a nearby pixel that has been decrypted. Consider the three color components
pR, pG, and pB of p: there are 3! = 6 possible shuffle permutations and 2
3 = 8 possible
negative-positive transformation selections, to obtain 6 × 8 = 48 total possible options, at
least one of which corresponds to the original state of the corresponding pixel in I. We
calculate the quantity above for each option and let the decrypted version of p be an option
that minimizes that quantity. As for the first pixel p, with no decrypted pixel q to compare
to, one may fix the original state of this p from Enc(I) or generate 48 possible full-image
decryptions by trying all possible options for the original state of the corresponding pixel
in I. 48 images is, of course, feasible to quickly scan by a human to find the most sensible
decryption.
In the algorithm below, min diff opt instantiated in Line 3 stores the option of shuffling
and negative-positive transforming that gives the minimal value so far in Lines 5-8 of (3.1)
and min diff instantiated in Line 4 stores that minimal value.
Algorithm 6: SKK Advanced Ciphertext-Only Attack.
Input: Encrypted input image Enc(I) of size U × V with at least one decrypted
pixel; number of bits L.
Modifies: Enc(I) to partially decrypt it.
1 foreach p = (u, v) ∈ Enc(I) do
2 Choose nearby pixel that has been decrypted q;
3 min diff opt ← p;
4 min diff ←∑C∈{R,G,B}|qC − pC |;
5 foreach option p∗ of p do // Each option is shuffle and neg-pos
6 if
∑
C∈{R,G,B}|qC − p∗C | < min diff then
7 min diff opt ← p∗;
8 min diff ←∑C∈{R,G,B}|qC − p∗C |;
9 p← min diff opt;
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Figure 8: An 8-bit image encrypted with the Sirichotedumrong, Kinoshita, and Kiya scheme,
a possible decryption using the more advanced attack above, and a grayscale version of the
decryption. Note how the left side of the decryption has coloring that reflects the coloring
of the original image.
Figure 9: Another 8-bit image encrypted with the Sirichotedumrong, Kinoshita, and Kiya
scheme, a possible decryption using the more advanced attack above, and a grayscale version
of the decryption.
Using this attack in experiments, we appear to sometimes get back images with objects
more clear and recognizable than objects in the images from the basic attack, along with
coloring that may partially reflect the coloring of the original image.
(Again, it is easy to think of non-realistic images that, when encrypted using the SKK
scheme, this attack would fail against.)
4 Conclusion
Above, we presented a chosen-plaintext attack against the Tanaka scheme and both a chosen-
plaintext attack and ciphertext-only attacks against the SKK scheme. As for the Tanaka
scheme and SKK same key variant, we reiterate the fundamental weakness of deterministic
encryption (i.e. that it can never be CPA secure) and point out that other techniques such
as homomorphic encryption are usually probabilistic. As for the SKK different keys variant,
more work needs to be done to develop image encryption schemes that presumably do not
allow the gradient magnitude to be exploited in the same manner as above; but such schemes
may deteriorate the performance of the encrypted images with machine learning and DNNs,
so this may be an intrinsic trade-off between security and performance.
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